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ABSTRACT. In this paper we have analyzed sequencing problem from both incentive
and normative aspects. We have identified unique class of VCG mechanisms that en-
sures egalitarian equivalence and we also have shown the possibility result with iden-
tical costs lower bound in that unique class of VCG mechanisms. Sequencing game
imposes a stronger restriction on the possible set of “reference position”, compared to
queuing game and that, in turn results into the failure of having a feasible VCG mech-
anism along with egalitarian equivalence. Although we found the necessary and suf-
ficient condition for the above mentioned unique class of egalitarian equivalent VCG
mechanism to satisfy identical costs lower bound when the number of participating
agents is two, necessary condition for the same for more than two agents remains an
open question. Lastly, we contemplate a situation where the restriction that sequenc-
ing problem imposes on “reference position” is overlooked, that is, we assume almost
no restriction (except the fact that it must be positive) on reference waiting time and
identify the class of VCG mechanism that is egalitarian equivalent.
JEL Classifications: D63, D71, D82;
Keywords: egalitarian equivalence, identical costs lower bound, outcome efficiency,
feasibility, budget balance, strategyproofness.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we analyze normative aspects of the sequencing problem. The main fea-
tures of a sequencing problem are as follows: (1) there are n agents and a single server,
(2) the server has multi-functional capability but can process one particular service at
a time, that is the server can serve one agent at a time (3) jobs may not be identical
across agents, so their service processing time may differ but is common knowledge.
We assume agents have quasi-linear preferences over positions in queue and monetary
transfers. Many real life phenomenon has this structure. A diagnostic center, installed
with a multi-functional machine (due to space shortage), where a certain number of
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enlisted patients visits for diagnosis, software installation problem to PCs of a set of
agents can be examples. Many other comparable situations can be found in Maniquet
(2003), Hashimoto and Saitoh (2012), Mukherjee (2013).
In case of sequencing problem, outcome efficiency is a widely studied allocation
rule1. In sequencing or queuing context outcome efficiency implies minimal aggregate
waiting cost. The seminal works of Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves(1973) shown
that outcome efficiency can be harnessed with stratefyproofness or non-manipulability.
Holmstro¨m(1979)’s result in context of sequencing problem implies a mechanism sat-
isfies strategyproofness and outcome efficiency if and only if it is a Vickerey-Clarke-
Groves (VCG) mechanism 2. We focus on the compatibility of a fairness axiom, egal-
itarian equivalence, introduced by Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) and get a subclass
of Vickerey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism that satisfies egalitarian equivalence.
Chun et al. (2014) has identified similar type of subclass of Vickerey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism for queuing problems. Their main assumption regarding the egal-
itarian equivalent reference bundle is; the reference position can only be an element
from the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. Hence, the reference waiting time is similarly restricted. In
our work, the only restriction on the reference waiting time is, it must be positive.
For two agents, we have identified a necessary and a sufficient condition to achieve
egalitarian equivalent VCG mechanism . For more than two agents, we have iden-
tified an interesting sufficient condition that guarantees egalitarian equivalent VCG
mechanism. Although we show that it is quite possible to have non-constant refer-
ence waiting time function, we argue why we need further restriction on the reference
waiting time function.
Mitra (2002) showed among more general and natural class of sequencing prob-
lems, sequencing problems with linear cost structure is the only class for which out-
come efficiency, budget balancedness and strategyproofness (known as first best) can
be achieved. We find that egalitarian equivalence is incompatible with first best sit-
uation. In this context Chun et al. (2014) attained feasibility along with egalitarian
1See Suijs (1996), Mitra (2002), Maniquet (2003) in this context
2See Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971), Groves (1973)
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equivalent VCG mechanism in case of queuing problem when the reference position
was the first position of the queue (but we get an impossibility result in case of se-
quencing problem, that is, no mechanism is efficient, feasible, non-manipulable and
egalitarian equivalent.
Sequencing problem have also been analyzed from the perspective of group ma-
nipulability . In this context we must mention the work of Mitra and Mutuswami
(2011) that shows there does not exist any mechanism that satisfies outcome efficiency
and strong group strategy-proofness in a single machine queuing context. Similarly
in sequencing Kayi and Ramaekers (2008) has shown that no rule satisfies outcome
efficiency and coalitional strategy-proofness. Whereas we show that, no mechanism
satisfies outcome efficiency, egalitarian equivalence and pair-wise weak group strate-
gyproofness which is weaker than group strategyproofness.
A mechachnism however good in itself, is incomplete unless the agent’s participa-
tion constrain is satisfied. To address this, we use an appropriate and context specific
condition known as identical costs lower bound3 which is based on the idea of iden-
tical preference lower bound, first introduced by Moulin (1990) which he termed as
egalitarian lower bound. This concept was applied in queuing problem by Maniquet
(2003), Chun (2006) and others. We find that the fairness notions identical costs lower
bound and egalitarian equivalence are not compatible if we add feasibility with out-
come efficiency and strategyproofness. Once feasibility is relax, we can have situation
where identical preference lower bound and egalitarian equivalence are compatible
with outcome efficiency and strategyproofness.
This paper has been arranged in the following way. In Section 2, we formally in-
troduce the model and add necessary definitions. In Section 3, we state and prove
characterization results regarding egalitarian equivalent VCG mechanism. In Section
4, we focus on feasibility and group staretegyproofness issues of egalitarian equiva-
lent VCG mechanism . In Section 5, we analyze the possibility of identical costs lower
bound property of egalitarian equivalent VCG mechanism. In Section 6, we again
go back to analyze the compatibility of egalitarian equivalence and VCG mechanism
3See Chun and Yengin (2017) [19]
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when the reference waiting time is a non-constant function of the type profile of the
agents. Lastly, in Section 7, we conclude the paper.
2. THE MODEL
We consider the set of agents N = {1, . . . , n} with a single machine. Each individ-
ual has a different kind of work to be executed by the machine. The machine can
process one job at a time. Let ∀i ∈ N, si ∈ <++ where si denotes the processing
time of ith agent and we assume s1 ≥ s2 ≥ . . . ≥ sn−1 ≥ sn without loss of gen-
erality. Each agent is identified with a positive waiting cost θi ∈ <++, the cost of
waiting per unit of time. The profile of waiting costs of the set of all agents is typ-
ically denoted by θ = (θ1, . . . ,θn) ∈ <n++. For any i ∈ N, θ−i denotes the profile
(θ1 . . .θi−1,θi+1, . . .θn) ∈ <n−1++ .
A sequence is an onto function σ : N → {1, . . . , n}. An allocation of n jobs can be
done in many ways. An allocation rule is a mapping σ : <n++ → Σ(N) that specifies
for each profile θ ∈ <n++ an allocation (rank) vector σ(θ) ∈ Σ(N). Agent i’s position
is denoted by σi(θ) which is an input of the vector σ(θ). Let Σ(N) denote the set of all
possible sequence of agents in N. Given σ ∈ Σ(N), ∀ ∈ N, Pi(σ) = { j ∈ N|σ j(θ) <
σi(θ)} denotes the set of predecessors of i and similarly P′i (σ) = { j ∈ N|σ j(θ) > σi(θ)}
denotes the set of successors of i. Agent i’s waiting time is denoted by Si(σ(θ)) and
corresponding waiting cost is Si(σ(θ))θi. A transfer rule is a mapping t : <n++ → <n
that specifies for each profile θ ∈ <n++ a transfer vector t(θ) = (ti(θ), . . . , tn(θ)) ∈ <n.
We assume that the utility function of each agent i ∈ N is quasi-liner and is of the form
Ui(σ(θ), ti(θ),θi) = −Si(σ(θ)(θi) + ti(θ), where ti(θ) is the monetary transfer of agent
to i.




The implication of outcome efficiency is that agents are ranked according to the non-
increasing order of their relative waiting costs (that is, if θi/si ≥ θ j/s j under a profile
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θ, then Si(σ(θ)) ≤ Si(σ(θ))). Moreover, there are profiles for which more than one
rank vector is efficient. For example, in case of queuing problem if all agents have
the same waiting cost, then all rank vectors are efficient. In the context of sequencing
problem, if the profile of waiting cost is (s1, s2, . . . , sn), then all agents have the same
relative waiting cost. Therefore, we have an efficiency correspondence. In this paper,
we choose a particular outcome efficient rule (that is, a single valued selection from
the outcome efficiency correspondence) using a tie breaking rule. For our outcome
efficient rule, we use the following tie breaking rule: if i < j and θi/si = θ j/s j then
Si(σ(θ)) < Si(σ(θ)). This tie breaking rule guarantees that, given a profile θ ∈ <n++,
the efficient rule selects a single rank vector from Σ(N).
A mechanism is (σ , t) constitutes of an allocation ruleσ and a transfer rule t. We are
interested in strategy proof mechanism for the sequencing problem.
Definition 2. A mechanism(σ , t) is strategy-proof (SP) if for all i ∈ N, for all θi,θ′i ∈
<++ and for all θ−i ∈ <(n−1)++ , −Si(σ(θi,θ−i))θi + ti(θi,θ−i) ≥ −Si(σ(θ′i ,θ−i))θi +
ti(θ′i ,θ−i).
It means, for every agents, reporting the true type weakly dominates reporting false
type. Hence, stragyproofness restricts any kind of unilateral deviation.
Definition 3. A mechanism(σ , t) is outcome efficient (OE) if for all announced profile
θ ∈ <n++,σ(θ) ∈ E(θ) = argminσ∈Σ(N) ∑ni=1 Si(σ)θi.
The main results of this paper that we derive in the next section is based on VCG
mechanism that we define next.
Definition 4. A mechanism (σ , t) is a VCG mechanism if for all θ,σ(θ) ∈ E(θ), and
the transfers are given by,
∀i ∈ N : ti(θ) = −∑
j 6=i
θ jS j(σ(θ)) + hi(θ−i).(1)
When the preferences are quasi-linear and the domain of type is convex then a mech-
anism is OE and SP if and only if it is a VCG mechanism. This result was due to
Holmstro¨m (1979).
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Definition 5. A mechanism (σ , t) satisfies egalitarian equivalence (EE) if for all θ ∈
<n++ there exist (S¯(θ), t(θ)) such that for all i ∈ N, −Si(σ(θ))θi + ti(θ) = −S¯(θ)θi +
t¯(θ).
Here (S¯(θ), t¯(θ)) denotes the reference bundle, where S¯(θ) is the reference waiting
time and t¯(θ) is the reference transfer. Egalitarian equivalence was introduced by
Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) and is based on the idea that all individuals should be
placed in a situation which is Pareto-indifferent to a perfectly egalitarian allocation.
In case of sequencing problem (S¯(θ), t¯(θ)) is such a reference bundle, where, if the
agent is placed remains indifferent to the original bundle that he receives under VCG
mechanism.
Definition 6. A mechanism (σ , t) satisfies budget balancedness (BB) if for all θ ∈
<n++, ∑
n
i=1 ti(θ) = 0.
Definition 7. A mechanism (σ , t) satisfies feasibility (FSB) if for allθ ∈ <n++, ∑ni=1 ti(θ)
≤ 0.
The profile θ and θ′ are S-variants if for all i ∈ N \ S, θi = θ′i .
Definition 8. A mechanism (σ , t) is weak group strategyproof (WSP) if for all S-
variants θ,θ′ Ui(σ(θ), ti(θ),θi) ≥ Ui(σ(θ′), ti(θ′),θi) for at least one i ∈ S.
This implies as long as all the group member are not strictly better off by deviating
from their true profile, such group will not be formed.
Definition 9. A mechanism (σ , t) is pair-wise weak group strategyproof (PWSP) if
for all S-variants θ,θ′ where |S| = 2, Ui(σ(θ), ti(θ),θi) ≥ Ui(σ(θ′), ti(θ′),θi) for at least
one i ∈ S.
This implies pair of agents deviates from their true profile by jointly misreporting
if an only if they are both strictly better off from the situation when they truthfully
reports.
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Consider any agent i ∈ N. If the agent i a-priori perceives that he is not different form
any agent j( 6= i) ∈ N (in terms of relative waiting cost) then he will consider every
feasible allocation σ ∈ ∑(N) as a possible outcome. Hence, we need to consider the
a-priori excepted cost perceived by agent i. Note that for any j( 6= i) ∈ N at position r
in the queue, waiting time imposed by agent j is(r− 1)(n− 2)!s j. So in total any agent
j( 6= i) ∈ N imposes ∑nr=1(r− 1)(n− 2)!s j = n(n− 1)!s j/2 amount of waiting time on
agent i and agent i can except all the n! allocations. Hence, the average waiting cost
perceived by agent i would be (si + ∑ j 6=i s j/2)θi where θi is the per unit time waiting
cost of agent i.
Definition 10. A mechanism (σ , t) satisfies identical costs lower bound (ICLB) if for
all θ ∈ <n++, for all i ∈ N, Ui(σ(θ), ti(θ),θi) ≥ −(si + ∑ j 6=i s j/2)θi.
This concept was first introduced by Moulin (1990) and is based on the idea that
an agent’s welfare is at least as that of consuming his equal share of resources. In
the context of sequencing problem agents are considered identical as long as their
relative waiting cost’s are same. That is for all i, j ∈ N, if θi/si = θ j/s j then agents
are considered identical. identical costs lower bound implies that any agent’s utility
should be at east as that of average or expected utility of that agent when he/she
perceives all the other agents as identical to himself.
3. EGALITARIAN EQUIVALENT VCG MECHANISM
In this section, we examine the implication of egalitarian equivalence on a strategy-
proof mechanism that satisfies efficient allocation rule. We will use slightly differ-
ent notation to refer an agent. An agent at i-th position of the queue is denoted
as agent (i). So the true waiting cost profile is θ = (θ(1),θ(2), . . . ,θ(n)) is such that
λ(1) ≥ λ(2) ≥ . . . ≥ λ(n) > 0 where ∀i ∈ N, λ(i) = θ(i)/s(i). Hence, ∀θ = (θ(i),θ(−i)) ∈
<n++, ∀i ∈ N, si 6= s(i).
The crucial fact behind the idea of egalitarian equivalent allocation where every-
one consumes the same “reference bundle” and derives same utility as they get with
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the initially allocated bundle. In case of queuing problem, Chun et al. (2014) have
completely characterized EE, SP and OE mechanisms. They restricted the reference
position, that can vary with type profile, on the set {1, 2, . . . , n} as these are the only
positions available in queuing problem with |N| agents. Hence, Chun et al. (2014)
avoided any arbitrary reference waiting time to keep the analysis natural for queuing
context.
Our modification in this context is the following: unlike queuing, in sequencing
problem agents differs in job processing time simply because different agents have
different jobs to process. Hence, it is not possible to contemplate all the position
{1,2,. . . ,n} as a potential reference bundle. For example, when N = {1, 2, 3}, if we fix
the reference position as the second position of the queue then S¯(θ) is perceived differ-
ently by different agents as S¯(θ) ∈ {(s1 + s2), (s1 + s3), (s2 + s3)}. Agent 1 in second
position may face (s1 + s2) or (s1 + s3) as waiting time, agent 2 can face (s1 + s2) or
(s2 + s3) and similarly agent 3 can perceive (s1 + s3) and (s2 + s3) . The only feasi-
ble reference position is the last position as whatever be the allocation and whoever
is the agent, the reference waiting time for the last position is always (s1 + s2 + s3).
Hence, to keep our analysis natural in sequencing context, we will assume the only
feasible reference position is the last position of the queue. Therefore, we will have
S¯(θ) = S¯ = ∑ni=1 si. With this set up we get the following result:
Proposition 1. A mechanism(σ , t) satisfies EE, SP and OE if and only if the reference
bundle for the profileθ ∈ <n++ (whereθ is a non-zero profile) is of the form (S¯(θ), t¯(θ))
where ∀θ ∈ <++ and t¯(θ) = ∑i∈N{S¯− S(i)(σ(θ))}θ(i) + k¯ when S¯(θ) = S¯.
Proof: Let us consider an announcement profile θ = (θ(1),θ(2), . . . ,θ(n)) ∈ <n++.
Therefore, given the OE allocation rule and the tie breaking rule, we can arrange
agents uniquely i.e. σ(i)(θ) = i. Since the domain of preference is quasi-linear and
type spaces for the agents are convex, it follows from Ho¨lmstrom’s result on efficient
and strategy-proof mechanisms that (σ , t) must be a VCG mechanism. This implies
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that the transfer is given by
∀i ∈ N : t(i)(θ) = − ∑
j 6=(i)
θ( j)S( j)(σ(θ)) + h(i)(θ−(i))(2)
If we set h(i)(θ−(i)) = ∑ j 6=(i) S( j)θ( j)(σ(θ−(i))) + g(i)(θ−(i)) in equation (2) we get
∀i ∈ N : t(i)(θ) = −s(i) ∑
j∈P′
(i)(σ(θ))
θ( j) + g(i)(θ−(i))(3)
As the mechanism (σ , t) satisfies EE, SP and OE the following condition must hold
∀i ∈ N : −θ(i)S(i)(σ(θ)) + t(i)(θ) = −θ(i) S¯+ t¯(θ)
Where the left side of the above equation is the utility from a VCG mechanism and the
right hand side is the utility from EE requirement.The above expression can alterna-
tively be written as
t¯(θ) = −θ(i)S(i)(σ(θ))− s(i) ∑
j∈P′
(i)(σ(θ))
θ( j) + g(i)(θ−(i) +θ(i) S¯(4)
Putting i = 1 into equation (4) we get,
t¯(θ) = −θ(1)S(1)(σ(θ))− s(1) ∑
j∈P′
(1)(σ(θ))
θ( j) + g(1)(θ−(1)) +θ(1) S¯
Similarly for i = 2 we have,
t¯(θ) = −θ(2)S(2)(σ(θ))− s(2) ∑
j∈P′
(2)(σ(θ))
θ( j) + g(2)(θ−(2)) +θ(2) S¯
Equating the expressions for t¯(θ) we get,−s(1)θ(1)− s(1)θ(2)+ g(1)(θ−(1)) = −θ(2)(s(1)+
s(2)) + (s(1) − s(2))∑ j∈P′
(2)(σ(θ))
θ j + g(2)(θ−(2))− S¯(θ(1) −θ(2)).
Since g(1)(θ−(1)) is independent of θ(1) and g(2)(θ−(2)) is independent of θ(2) we get
g(1)(θ−(1)) = (S¯− s(2))θ(2) + f(1)(θN\{(1),(2)}) and g(2)(θ−(2)) = (S¯− s(1))θ(1)
+ f(2)(θN\{(1),(2)}). Now comparing the expression for t¯(θ) for i = 1 and i = 3 and
using the expression of g(1)(θ−(1)) we have,
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(S¯− s(1))θ(1) + (S¯− s(2))θ(2) + f(1)(θN\{(1),(2)}) = −θ(3)(s(1) + s(2) + s(3)) + s(1)θ(2) +
s(1)θ(3) + (s(1) − s(2))∑ j∈P′
(3)(σ(θ))
θ( j) + g(3)(θ−(3)) + S¯θ(3).
Comparing the expressions on both sides in the similar fashion we get g(1)(θ−(1)) =
(S¯ − s(2))θ(2) + {S¯ − (s(2) + s(3))}θ(3) + f ′(1)(θN\{(1),(2),(3)}) and g(3)(θ−(3)) = (S¯ −
s(1))θ1 + {S¯− (s(1) + s(2))}θ(2) + f(3)(θN\{(1),(2),(3)}).





{S¯− S( j)(σ(θN\{(1)}))}θ( j) + k(1)
In fact (it can easily be shown that) the above expression, holds not only for i = 1 but





{S¯− S( j)(σ(θN\{(i)}))}θ( j) + k(i)
Now we further get ∀i, j ∈ N, ki = k j = k¯ by using the above expression of g(i)(θ−(i))
into t¯(θ) in equation (4) and equating them. Hence




{S¯− S( j)(σ(θN\{(i)}))}θ( j) + k¯(5)
Using the above expression of gi(θ(−i)) in equation (4) we have, t¯(θ) = ∑i∈N{S¯} −
S(i)(σ(θ))}θ(i) + k¯.
Therefore it follows that when S¯(θ) = S¯, a mechanism satisfies EE, SP and OE only if
the reference bundle for the profile θ i.e. (S¯(θ), t(θ)) is of the form t¯(θ) = ∑i∈N{S¯−
Si(σ(θ))}θi + k¯.
Sufficiency is fairly obvious, hence omitted. 




{S¯− S( j)(σ(θ))}θ( j) + k¯.(6)
4. FEASIBILITY AND PAIR WISE WEAK GROUP STRATEGYPROOFNESS
Proposition 2. In a sequencing problem no mechanism satisfies OE, SP, EE and FSB.
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Proof: For all i ∈ N and for all θ = (θ(1),θ(2), . . . ,θ(n)) we have t(i)(θ) = ∑ j 6=i{S¯ −
S( j)(σ(θ))}θ( j) + k¯. If FSB holds then for all θ = (θ(1),θ(2), . . . ,θ(n)), ∑i∈N t(i)(θ) ≤ 0.
Therefore, we have the following: ∑i∈N{S(i)(σ(θ)) − S¯}θ(i) ≥ nk¯/(n − 1). If k¯ ≥ 0,
consider the profile θ = (θ(n),θ−(n)) such that for all j 6= n,θ( j) = 1. Since, S¯ =
∑i∈N s(i) = S(n), we have ∑i∈N{S(i)(σ(θ))− S¯}θ(i) < nk¯/(n− 1). If k¯ < 0, consider the
profile θ = (θ(1),θ−(1)) such that for all j 6= 1,θ( j) = 1 and θ(1) = (1 + 2k¯/(S(1) − S¯)).
Then as S¯ = ∑i∈N s(i) = S(n), we have ∑i∈N{S(i)(σ(θ))− S¯}θ(i) < nk¯/(n− 1).
Hence, FSB is violated. 
Remark 1. The consequence of the above proposition is, in case of sequencing prob-
lem, no mechanism satisfies OE, SP, EE and BB.
Proposition 3. Consider a sequencing problem such that |N| > 2. Then no mechanism
satisfies OE, PWSP, EE.
Proof: If a mechanism (σ , t) satisfies EE, SP and OE then for all θ ∈ <n++ the allocation
of an agent i ∈ N is given by (σ(θ), t(i)(θ) = ∑ j 6=i{S¯− S( j)(σ(θ))}θ( j)). Suppose the
true waiting cost profile is θ = (θ(1),θ(2), . . . ,θ(n)) is such that λ(1) > λ(2) > . . . >
λ(n) > 0 where for all i ∈ N, λ(i) = θ(i)/s(i). Consider ∀i ∈ N, θ′(i) = θ(i) +1 such
that 1 = min(s( j)λ( j−1) −θ( j))/2, j ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n}. Let agents (1) and (2) jointly mis-
reports as θ′(1) = θ(1) + 1 and θ
′
(2) = θ(2) + 1. The basic idea is to construct a new
profile , such that, under this new misreported profile relative queue position is unal-
tered. Notice that, under this new profileθ∗ = (θ′(1),θ
′
(2),θ(3),θ(4), . . . ,θ(n)), t(2)(θ
∗) >
t(2)(θ) and t(1)(θ∗) > t(1)(θ) since 1 > 0 by construction. Hence, profitable group de-
viation exists for agents (1) and (2). Therefore, PWSP is impossible along with OE and
EE. 
Remark 2. In a sequencing problem with exactly two agents the class of mechanisms
that satisfy EE, OE and SP is also PWSP. That is, group manipulation is impossible in
that case.
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5. IDENTICAL COSTS LOWER BOUND(ICLB) AND EGALITARIAN EQUIVALENT VCG
MECHANISM
Proposition 4. In case of two agents consider a mechanism that satisfies OE,SP,EE then
it also satisfies ICLB if and only if k¯ ≥ −s(2)θ(1)/2
Proof: In two agent case a typical profile is (θ(1),θ(2)) ∈ <2++. Hence, in the efficient
allocation λ(1) ≥ λ(2), that is, s(2)θ(1) > s(1)θ(2). For sequencing problem with two
agents, the reference waiting time is S¯ = s(1) + s(2).
ICLB is compatible with egalitarian equivalent VCG mechanism if for all i ∈ N and
for all θ = (θ(1),θ(2)) ∈ <2++, U(i)(S¯, t¯(θ)) ≥ C(i)(θ) or
(7) −S¯θ(i) +∑
j 6=i





Consider, i = 1. Then following equation (7) we have, −{s(1) + s(2)}θ(1) + {(s(1) +
s(2)− s(1)}θ(1)+ {s(1)+ s(2)− s(1)− s(2)}θ(2) ≥ −{s(1)+ s(2)/2}θ(1). Solving the above
equation we get, (i).. k¯ ≥ −s(2)θ(1)/2.
Similarly, for i = 2, following equation (7) we have, −{s(1) + s(2)}θ(2) + {(s(1) + s(2)−
s(1)}θ(1)+ {s(1)+ s(2)− s(1)− s(2)}θ(2) ≥ −{s(2)+ s(1)/2}θ(2). Solving the above equa-
tion we get,(ii).. s(2)θ(1) + k¯ ≥ −s(1)θ(2)/2.
Notice that, if (i) holds then (ii) holds trivially. Therefore, condition (i), that is,
k¯ ≥ −s(2)θ(1)/2 is necessary and sufficient condition4 for ICLB along with egalitar-
ian equivalent VCG mechanism for two agents. 
Proposition 5. Consider a mechanism (σ , t) that satisfies OE, SP, EE if k¯ ≥ 0 then it
satisfies ICLB.










(S¯− S( j))θ( j) + k¯ ≥ 0
(8)
4It is the average negative externality that is imposed on the first served agent by the last served agent.
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Note that, ∑ j 6=i(S¯− S( j))θ( j) = ∑r∈P(i)(σ(θ))(S¯− Sr)θr + ∑q∈P′(i)(σ(θ))(S¯− Sq)θq.











θr. But, s(i) ∑r∈P(i)(σ(θ))θr −θr ∑r∈P(i)(σ(θ)) sr ≥ 0,
because agents with higher λ(·) are placed in the earlier positions of the queue ( since




sq − ∑r∈P(i)(σ(θ)) sr
)
θ(i) +
∑ j 6=i(S¯− S( j))θ( j) > 0. Since k¯ ≥ 0, therefore U(i)(σ(θ))− C(i)(θ) > 0.
Hence ICLB holds. 
6. EGALITARIAN EQUIVALENT VCG MECHANISM REVISITED
This section is a diversion from the natural condition of sequencing problem. Ideally
there should be an one to one correspondence between reference position and refer-
ence waiting time that had been in the context of queuing problem ( See Chun et al.
(2014)). The same is true with sequencing if and only if reference position is the last
position of the queue. But now we assume any positive reference waiting time is pos-
sible. We have already seen that if reference position is assumed to be constant then
egalitarian equivalent VCG mechanism is achievable. Now we ask the following ques-
tion: what if the reference position is explicitly a function of the type profile θ where
θ = (θ1,θ2, . . . ,θn) ∈ <n++? The answer that we have found is a sufficient one, al-
though not necessary. Our hunch about the necessary condition is that the reference
position function S¯(θ) should be symmetric in nature, that is, ∀θ,θ′ where θ′ is some
permutation of θ we need S¯(θ) = S¯(θ′) for symmetry.
Lemma 1. A mechanism (σ , t) satisfies EE, SP and OE only if ∀i, j(i 6= j) ∈ N, ∀θ ∈
<n++ : hi(θi)− h j(θ j) = S¯(θ)(θ j −θi).
Proof: The general form of VCG transfer is the followed form equation (2) and in this
case is of the following form.
∀i ∈ N : ti(θ) = −∑
j 6=i
θ jS j(σ(θ)) + hi(θ−i)(9)
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So a VCG mechanism is egalitarian equivalent if ∀θ ∈ <n++ the following holds:
∀i ∈ N : −θiSi(σ(θ)) + ti(θ) = −θi S¯(θ) + t¯(θ)(10)
Using equations (9) and (10) we have
−θiSi(σ(θ))−∑
j 6=i
θ jS j(σ(θ)) + hi(θ−i) = −θi S¯(θ) + t¯(θ)
or C(σ(θ)) + hi(θ−i) = −θi S¯(θ) + t¯(θ)(11)
where C(σ(θ)) denotes the cost under efficient allocation when the type profile is θ.
For any θ ∈ <n++ and any i 6= j ∈ N, using equation (11) we get
hi(θi)− h j(θ j) = S¯(θ)(θ j −θi).(12)
Thus the lemma is proved. 
Proposition 6. If N = {1, 2}, a mechanism (σ , t) satisfies EE, SP and OE only if S¯(θ) is
symmetric.
Proof: Consider, θ = (θ1,θ2) and θ′ = (θ′1,θ′2) where θ′1 = θ2 and θ′2 = θ1. Using
equation (12) we get the following: When the type profile is θ = (θ1,θ2)) then
h1(θ2)− h2(θ1) = S¯(θ1,θ2)(θ2 −θ1) ...(I)
and when the type profile is θ′ = (θ′1,θ′2) then
h1(θ1)− h2(θ2) = S¯(θ2,θ1)(θ1 −θ2)...(II)
Since equation (12) holds for all θ ∈ <++2 , from (I) and (II) we have h1(θ2) = h2(θ1) =
h(θ¯) when θ1 = θ2 = θ¯. Hence, the functional form of h1(· ) = h2(· ) = h(· ). Hence,
the equation (12), in this case, can be rewritten as h(θ2) − h(θ1) = S¯(θ1,θ2)(θ2 −
θ1)...(1) when θ = (θ1,θ2). If θ′ = (θ′1,θ′2) then h(θ1)− h(θ2) = S¯(θ2,θ1)(θ1 −θ2)...(2).
Form (1) and (2) we have, S¯(θ) = S¯(θ′). Hence, S¯(θ) is symmetric. 
Proposition 7. If ∀θ ∈ <n++, S¯(θ) = ∑(∏(1≤t≤n)θktt ) where ∑nt=1 kt = m ∈ N (set of
natural numbers) and hi(θ−i) = ∑(∏(t 6=i)θ
k′t
t ) where ∑t 6=i k′t = (m+ 1) then a mecha-
nism mechanism (σ , t) satisfies EE, SP and OE.
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Proof: If ∀θ ∈ <n++, S¯(θ) = ∑(∏(1≤t≤n)θktt ) where ∑nt=1 kt = m ∈ N and hi(θ−i) =
∑(∏(t 6=i)θ
k′t
t ) where ∑t 6=i k′t = (m + 1) then it can be easily verified that lemma (1)
holds. Hence the proposition is proved. 
Remark 3. Consider N = {1, 2}. Assume ∀θ ∈ <2++, S¯(θ(1),θ(2)) = ∑mi=1(θ(m−i)(1) θ
(i−1)
(2) )
where m ∈ N. Then with h1(θ−1) = θm2 and h2(θ−2) = θm1 we can see that egalitarian
equivalent VCG mechanism is compatible.
Notice that, in particular, a sequencing problem with s1 = s2 = s (=1 assumed in the
literature of queuing) is also a queuing problem . Therefore, unlike Chun et al. (2014),
in this situation S¯(θ1,θ2) can be of the above form that we have just mentioned and
hence not of constant value.
7. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have analyzed sequencing problem from both incentive and norma-
tive approaches. We have identified unique class of VCG mechanisms that ensures
egalitarian equivalence and we also have shown the possibility result with identical
preference lower bound in that unique class of VCG mechanisms. Sequencing game
imposes a stronger restriction on the possible set of “reference position”, compared
to queuing game and that in turn results into the failure of having a feasible VCG
mechanism along with egalitarian equivalence.
Although found the necessary and sufficient condition for the above mentioned
unique class of egalitarian equivalent VCG mechanism to satisfy identical costs lower
bound when the number of participating agents is two, necessary condition for the
same when the number of participating agent is more than two remains an open ques-
tion.
Lastly, we contemplate the situation where the restriction that sequencing problem
imposes reference position is overlooked, that is, we assume the almost no restriction
(except the fact that it must be positive) reference waiting time and identify the class
of VCG mechanism that is egalitarian equivalent.
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